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Abstract. We study the U.S. Operations Research/Industrial-Systems Engineering (ORIE)
faculty hiring network, consisting of 1,179 faculty origin and destination data together
with attribute data from 83 ORIE departments. A social network analysis of faculty hires
can reveal important patterns in an academic field, such as the existence of a hierarchy
or sociological aspects such as the presence of communities of departments. We first sta-
tistically test for the existence of a linear hierarchy in the network and for its steepness.
We find a near linear hierarchical order of the departments, proposing a new index for
hiring networks, which we contrast with other indicators of hierarchy, including published
rankings. A single index is not capable to capture the full structure of a complex net-
work, however, so we next fit a latent exponential random graph model (ERGM) to the
network, which is able to reproduce its main observed characteristics: high incidence of
self-hiring, skewed out-degree distribution, low density and clustering. Finally, we use
the latent variables in the ERGM to simplify the network to one where faculty hires take
place among three groups of departments. We contrast our findings with those reported
for other related disciplines, Computer Science and Business.
Keywords: hierarchical networks, exponential random graph models, latent location
graph model, academic market analysis.
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1. Introduction
A faculty hiring network is represented by a graph G = (V,E) composed of vertices
vi ∈ V, i = 1, ..., n denoting university departments in a given academic discipline, and
directed arcs eij ∈ E, i, j = 1, 2, ..., n whose integer value attribute denotes the number of
faculty hired by department vj who received their Ph.D.’s in department vi. A department
hiring a Ph.D. from another department generates a directed edge in the network going
from the sender department to the receiver department. In the pre-internet era, the study
of faculty hiring networks was confined to departments of Sociology (Schichor, 1970; Burris,
2004) where directories with the necessary faculty information existed in print. Today, with
most departments and faculty posting their information in personal web pages, studying a
faculty hiring network has become easier to do even if no directories are available, provided
the faculty information is gathered. There now exist analyses of faculty hiring networks
in a broad range of disciplines in the US, such as Political Science (Fowler et al. , 2007;
Schmidt & Chingos, 2007), Mathematics (Myers et al. , 2011), Communication (Mai et al.
, 2015), Business (Clauset et al. , 2015), Computer Science (Clauset et al. , 2015; Huang
et al. , 2015), Law (Katz et al. , 2011), and History (Clauset et al. , 2015).
Researchers have studied the hiring and placement patterns of their academic fields
for a variety of reasons. One concept these studies attempt to clarify is the prestige of a
department, a rather elusive and inadequately theorized concept (Burris, 2004) but popular
among university administrators. Departmental prestige can be studied as an effect due
to the position of the department in a hierarchy existing in the faculty hiring network,
as these positions provide a ranking within a discipline. Some authors have considered
hiring networks for the purpose of determining the inequality in the production of Ph.Ds
(Clauset et al. , 2015), an apparently general phenomena in which a small number of
departments produce a large fraction of the Ph.Ds hired as professors. Others have studied
these networks to determine inequalities in the hiring process (e.g., of women, see Way et al.
(2016)), or to study the sociological aspects of a discipline (Fowler et al. , 2007; Katz et al.
, 2011), e.g., whether communities or a dominance hierarchy exists among departments.
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Hiring and placing of Ph.D. students is also studied in some areas to understand how new
ideas are disseminated through a profession.
In this paper we make available and model the U.S. ORIE hiring faculty network.
The network is composed of departments/programs/schools (from now on, ”departments”)
within these 3 inter-related fields. Appendix 1 gives a list of all the 83 ORIE departments
considered and how they were selected for this study. The ORIE dataset was compiled in
summer 2016. We first perform statistical tests on the existence and steepness of a linear
dominance hierarchy among the 83 ORIE departments. Having found strong evidence of
such hierarchy, we then introduce the notion of a minimum violation and strength (MVS)
measure of departmental prestige, and use it to compute a near linear hierarchy for the
ORIE network, contrasting it with other more common measures of individual importance
in a social network, including published ORIE rankings (US News and NRC). Given that
single measures of department prestige provide an inherently incomplete description of a
complex network, we further model the positions of each department in the network as
latent variables in an exponential random graph model that allows us to consider the un-
certainty in the edge data and permits to find groups of related departments. With these
positions, we reduce the ORIE network to a simpler network of faculty hires between and
within 3 groups of departments. Throughout this study, we compare the ORIE faculty
hiring network with similar networks in related academic disciplines. We conclude with a
summary and discussion of the implications of our findings.
2. Descriptive statistics of the ORIE network compared to those from
related disciplines.
ORIE faculty data were collected during May-June of 2016 from faculty web pages
working in institutions in the USA. A list of all Ph.D. granting institutions considered and
the criteria used for their inclusion are given in Appendix 1. In total, 1179 faculty from
83 ORIE departments were considered in the analysis. Table 1 lists general descriptive
statistics of the ORIE network compared to those of two closely related fields, Computer
Science and Business schools, networks analyzed by Clauset et al. (2015), excluding their
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“Earth” (outside US) department and links from and to this vertex. The ORIE network
is considerably smaller, with an average department size of 14.2 faculty compared to 21.4
faculty for CS and the much bigger schools of Business with an average number of 70.1
faculty. Two distinctive characteristics of the ORIE network relative to CS and Business
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the ORIE network compared to that of Computer
Science departments and Schools of Business. Assortativity is a measure of how much
vertices with similar values of an attribute connect together (the Minimum Violation
Ranking (MVR) is explained in section 4.)
Assortativity
Network Vertices Edges (% Female) Self-edges/edges Density Degree MVR Reciprocity
ORIE 83 1179 (19.5) 0.1399 0.1121 0.1452 0.4614 0.1538
CS 205 4388 (25.6) 0.0711 0.0688 0.2964 0.5327 0.1264
Business 112 7856 (16.8) 0.0556 0.2738 0.2661 0.4330 0.2197
(see Table 1) are a) its much larger proportion of “incestuous” Ph.D. hiring, given by the
self-edges in the network (14% of all faculty, almost three times that in Business and close
to twice that of CS) and b) its lower degree assortativity. Figure 1 (top) depicts the number
of self-hires among the 83 ORIE departments, sorted in a hierarchy that will be explained
below. Note how prevalent self-hiring is: 74% of the ORIE departments have (as of summer
2016) at least one former Ph.D. student hired as faculty. This is similar than in Business
schools (74%) but higher than in Computer Science departments (58%). Almost 14% of all
ORIE faculty are hired by their originating department. In some departments, self-hires
account for more than 40% of the faculty (see Figure 1, bottom). Our dataset, however,
lacks information about cases when a faculty returns to her alma mater after working in
other departments, that is, cases where the self-hiring was not direct from graduate school
to faculty.
The assortativity index is a correlation measure of how much vertices with similar values
of a given scalar attribute tend to be connected together (for this and other descriptive net-
work statistic definitions, see, e.g., Newman (2010)). Shown in Table 1 are the assortativity
measurements with respect to two vertex attributes. The first one, assortativity based on
the total degree of each vertex (department) indicates a lower tendency for ORIE depart-
ments, compared to those in CS and Business, to establish hiring-placement connections
with departments with a similar total number of hires and placements. The assortativity
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Figure 1. Top: in blue, observed number of self-hires among the 83 ORIE departments
sorted by MVS2 hierarchy index described later in this paper. Bottom: self hires as a
percentage of all faculty in each department, sorted by MVS2 index. While self-hires
are more numerous in the top departments, self-hires as a proportion of total faculty are
significant across all the ORIE departments. In red, expected number of self-hires (µii)
as predicted by the latent location ERGM model described in section 5.
with respect to the MVR indices is an indication of how likely departments establish hiring-
placement relations with departments equally ranked in a hiring hierarchy to be discussed
in section 4. For ORIE, this assortativity is between that of CS and Business.
Other descriptive statistics in the ORIE network shown in Table 1 tend to be also
somewhere between those of the CS and the Business networks. The density or connectance
of the ORIE network, defined as the number of non-zero entries in the adjacency matrix Y
divided by the maximum number of possible edges, is between CS (which has a very sparse
network) and Business (which is densest). As it will be shown below, the ORIE faculty
hiring network is actually quite sparse except for a group of departments, those at the top
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Figure 2. Lorenz curves indicating the inequality in the percentage of faculty production
in ORIE, Computer Science, and Business as a percentage of the number of departments.
About 10% of ORIE departments generate close to half of all ORIE faculty.
of a hiring hierarchy, which connect more often among them. The proportion of female
faculty in ORIE is 19.5%, higher than in CS (16.8%) but lower than in Business schools
(25.6%), an inequality that calls for further analysis that is beyond the present study. Also
shown in Table 1 is the reciprocity, the proportion of departments with exchanges of mutual
hires. The reciprocity of the ORIE network is also between that of CS and Business.
Finally, the inequality in the production of Ph.D.’s among ORIE departments, although
quite large, is also between that of CS departments and Business schools. Figure 2 shows
the Lorenz curves for the proportion of Ph.D.’s produced. Approximately, 10% of the
ORIE departments generate about 50% of the faculty, although this is not as pronounced
as in Business schools, which have a very steep Lorenz curve near zero, with around 3%
schools generating 40% of the faculty.
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3. Existence of a linear dominance hierarchy
Given a faculty hiring network, a question of interest is if it is possible to order the de-
partments in such a way to form a linear dominance hierarchy. The concept of dominance,
popular in social networks in ecology and competitive sports, refers to an attribute of the
pattern of repeated interactions between two individuals, characterized by a consistent
outcome in favor of the same individual in a dyad (de Vries, 1995). The consistent winner
is dominant and the loser subordinate. Individuals form a linear dominance hierarchy if
and only if a) for every dyad (i, j) either i dominates j or j dominates i and b) every
triad is transitive, i.e., for any individuals i, j and k it is true that if i dominates j and
j dominates k, then i dominates k. Transitivity is equivalent to a dominance hierarchy
that is acyclic (Ali et al. , 1986). The notion of a dominance hierarchy has been studied
in faculty networks by Clauset et al. (2015), Huang et al. (2015) and Mai et al. (2015).
Applied to faculty hiring networks, if a department vj hires more Ph.Ds from department
vi than the number vi hires from vj , the relationship between these two vertices implies a
“dominance” relation of department i with respect to department j, given that j wishes
more strongly to have access to the students produced in department i and not viceversa
(ties are therefore allowed). In his study of animal societies, Landau (1951) defined a score
structure W = (wi, w2, ..., wn) where each wj equals the number of individuals dominated
by element j. A hierarchy is then a score structure
W = (w1 = n− 1, w2 = n− 2, ..., wn = 0)
so that the members of the society can be ordered as 1  2  3  ...  n, with each
dominating all the members below it, and being dominated by all those above. At the
opposite extreme is an “egalitarian” society where assuming n odd, W = (w1 =
n−1
n , w2 =
n−1
n , ..., wn =
n−1
n ). Landau (1951) then introduced his “hierarchy index” h, a measure of
the variability of the wj ’s normalized so that h = 0 implies equality (egalitarian dominance)
and h = 1 implies a perfect linear hierarchy, with h equal to
h =
12
n(n2 − 1)
n∑
j=1
(
wj − n− 1
2
)2
.
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Of course, a perfect linear hierarchy may not exist in a society, and some violations to a
perfect linear hierarchy may exist, a topic we discuss in section 4.
A practical difficulty when determining if a linear hierarchy exists in a society (and in
general, for any other inference one desires to attempt based on observed social interac-
tions) is that we may have few data points about individuals interacting, with many not
interacting during the observation period. The basic approach to deal with the spareness of
the observed adjacency matrix (or sociomatrix) Y is to treat it is a realization of a stochas-
tic process, and to use nonparametric tools for statistical inference. Along this approach
is de Vries (1995), who introduces a randomization test for the hypothesis of no linear
hierarchy based on Landau’s h statistic that takes into account unknown tied relationships
(in our case, these are departments that have never hired each other’s Ph.D. students). To
perform the test, each dyad (i, j) is randomized m times and the h statistic is computed
for each random sociomatrix giving a set of numbers {hs}ms=1. h is also computed for the
observed sociomatrix. If the empirical p-value of the test, defined as 1 − |{hs > h}|/m
(where | · | indicates cardinality) is small, this is evidence the observed linear hierarchy is
statistically different than that of a random matrix, which has no hierarchy.
Ordering individuals in a linear or near-linear hierarchy is justified only if there is sta-
tistical evidence in favor of such hierarchy comparing the existing hierarchy to what could
be obtained from a random matrix. Finding a near-linear hierarchy (h < 1) is a hard com-
binatorial problem about which we comment below. Figure 3 shows results of the deVries
tests applied to the ORIE, CS and Business networks (data for CS and Business are from
2015 taken from Clauset et al. (2015)). The empirical p-values are zero for all 3 disciplines,
implying there is a statistically significant linear hierarchy in each of the three networks.
If a linear or near-linear hierarchy is significant, a related question is how steep is the
hierarchy. In Appendix 2 we statistically test for the significance of the steepness of a linear
hierarchy (De Vries et al. , 2006), and find that the ORIE, CS and Business networks all
have a hierarchy with a statistically significant slope.
The tests for the significance of a linear hierarchy and for a significant slope were re-
peated for the top ORIE departments (sorted according to the MVS2 index in Table A1 in
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Figure 3. DeVries’ test for the presence of a linear dominance hierarchy in the complete
(n = 83) ORIE network (Left), the Computer Science network (Middle, n = 205) and the
Business network (Right, n = 112). Randomization distribution (10K simulations) under
the null hypothesis of random graph of Landau’s h values. Red vertical lines are the
observed h values. In all cases, the empirical p-values are 0.0, indicating strong evidence
of the presence of a hierarchy in each of three faculty networks.
Appendix 1, further discussed below). Table 2 shows the results of these tests applied to
an increasing number of (sorted) departments. The slope is quite steep and significant only
for the first 10 departments. Overall, for the 83 ORIE departments the slope is statistically
different from zero, but its actual numerical value is rather small.
Similarly to the tests in this section, in the sequel we will again treat the observed
network as a noisy realization of possible networks, and following Clauset et al. (2015) we
will use a “bootstrapping” approach to network creation to help perform an analysis that
considers other possible (sparse) networks that could have been observed by chance.
Table 2. Dominance hierarchy linearity and steepness test results for different ORIE
subnetworks. The hierarchy is steeper closer to the top, where it is also much denser.
Hierarchy considered is the MVS2 hierarchy explained in section 4.
No. of departments Density(connectance) Observed h p-value Slope p-value
Top 10 0.6000 0.5590 0.0307 -0.4281 0.0000
Top 20 0.4025 0.3036 0.0098 -0.2061 0.0000
Top 50 0.1912 0.1328 0.0004 -0.0688 0.0000
All 83 0.1121 0.0701 0.0000 -0.0278 0.0000
3.1. A caveat: “observational zeroes” in a sparse sociomatrix. The preceding
analysis indicates that the 83 ORIE departments can be ranked according to a statistically
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significant near linear hierarchy using hire-placement data, even though the hierarchy ap-
pears to be quite flat for most of the n departments except at the very top of the hierarchy.
The de Vries’ steepness test (Appendix 2) depends on the number of interactions between
the actors or individuals in the network. In animal behavior, the ideal way to find a hier-
archy is to observe pairwise competitions in a balanced (designed) “tournament” (David,
1987), but in the field of social network data an abundance of “observational zeroes” makes
it more difficult to determine a hierarchy. Although no formal power analysis is available,
de Vries (1995) gives some numerical evidence to suggest that the power of the linearity
test to detect an existing hierarchy goes down when the frequency of observational zeroes
increases, and it is quite possible the same occurs in the steepeness test. Table 2 shows
how the connectance (density) of the departments among the top of the hierarchy is much
higher than among the rest, and this implies the test statistics have more information
about placements and hires within this group that among dyads that include at least one
individual ranked lower in the hierarchy.
The predominance of zeroes in a sociomatrix may not necessarily indicate there are no
dominance relations among the dyads. As warned by de Vries et al. (2006) one should
be careful when interpreting linearity and steepness tests for societies in which there are
very few pairwise interactions recorded. This warning is by extension worth keeping in
mind when trying to find a dominance relation or ranking in a faculty hiring network. We
can distinguish between three types of “observational zeroes” in the adjacency matrix (or
sociomatrix): a) in animal behavior, if two individuals are not observed to interact, it may
be because there is a dominance relation present, with the subordinate individual avoiding
the dominant individual. We will call the similar case of departments avoiding hiring from
higher ranked departments deference or avoidance zeroes. Alternatively, b) there may
simply be no dominance-subordinate relation between two individuals that “respect” each
other, a case analogous to departments that do not have hiring-placement relations simply
due to their finite capacity, which limits the possibility of observing more hiring-placement
relations, a case we will call equality zeroes. Finally, c) it could happen that we have not
observed long enough the network and the question of whether there is a dominance between
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two individuals is unresolved. This would be the case when relatively young departments
have not established hiring-placement relations with many departments simply because
their young age. This case will be called unresolved zeroes. It is not possible, however,
to determine from the data what kind of “observational zeroes” one is dealing with in a
particular hiring network.
With these precautionary notes we now proceed to find a near linear hierarchy in the
ORIE network. For the CS and Business networks, see Clauset et al. (2015). The presence
of “observational zeroes” and the low density of the ORIE network justifies the bootstrap-
ping approach of the next section. Likewise, the different connectance among strata of the
hierarchy and its corresponding changes in steepness also justifies the search for groups
(communities) of departments, a task we address in Section 5.
4. The Minimum violations and minimum violations and strength indices
Let Y be the adjacency matrix of a faculty hiring network. Clauset et al. (2015) define
a hierarchical index given by a permutation pi that induces the minimum number of edges
that “point up” the hierarchy. This is found by
(1) min
pi(Y)
S(pi(Y)) = min
pi(Y)
∑∑
i>j
Yij sign(pi(i)− pi(j))
Thus, if there is an edge from i to j (Yij > 0) and sign(pi(i)−pi(j)) = +1 (i.e., pi(i) > pi(j))
this means a lower ranked department in the hierarchy has placed a faculty at a higher
ranked department (recall rank one is highest), in other words, we have a “violation” of
the hierarchy implied by pi and this will increase S(pi(Y)). Similarly, if there is an edge
from i to j and sign(pi(i) − pi(j)) = −1 (i.e., pi(i) < pi(j)), this is not a violation, and
will make S(pi(Y)) decrease. A permutation pi(Y) that minimizes (1) is called a minimum
violation ranking (MVR) which has been proposed as the optimal way of rankings players in
a round-robin tournament (Ali et al. , 1986). For networks where a perfect linear hierarchy
does not exist (h < 1, thus violations are unavoidable) solving (1) is a hard combinatorial
problem. Problem (1) is in particular equivalent to reordering the columns and rows of
the adjacency matrix such that we get an upper triangular matrix, a problem which has
been proved to be NP-complete (Charon & Hudry, 2010). For the 83 departments in the
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ORIE network, however, an exact algorithm for finding the MVR’s, such as Pedings et al.
(2012) binary linear integer programming formulation, is computationally feasible. Note
that multiple optimal MVR rankings with the same number of violations may exists in a
complex network. Although we will argue that the MVRs do not fully reflect the hierarchy
of a faculty hiring network, Table A1 in Appendix 1 lists the MVR rankings of the 83
ORIE departments considered in this study for completeness.
Rather than solving (1), which considers only the number of violations, we could also
consider the strength of each violation. To obtain a dominance relation in a society of
animals, de Vries (1998) defines the strength of the violations in a sociomatrix as:
(2) min
pi(Y)
SMVS1(pi(Y)) = min
pi(Y)
∑∑
i>j
(i− j)Yij
where the difference (i− j) (with i > j) measures the strength of a violation in the ranking
(which exists if Yij > 0). In our case, entries under the diagonal are unexpected faculty
hires, where department j hires a number of faculty from a lower ranked department
i. We will refer to the resulting rankings from solving (2) the Minimum violations and
strength rankings and will denote them by MVS1. To obtain these rankings, we modify
the stochastic search algorithm in Clauset et al. (2015) to account for the strength of a
violation (see Appendix 3). The ORIE MVS1 rankings are shown in Table A1 in Appendix
1.
A problem with both the MVR and MVS1 rankings previously proposed in the literature
on hiring networks is that a department that places few of its own Ph.D. students, despite
hiring from the top departments, may be ranked very low. For instance, this is the case,
under both MVR and MVS1 rankings, of Naval Postgraduate School OR dept., which
received among the lowest rankings using these two indices. A department that consistently
hires from top ranked departments should be ranked higher than one that not only does
not place its Ph.Ds but also does not have any hiring interactions with the top ranked
group. To illustrate, a bar graph of the adjacency matrix Y sorted according to the MVS1
rankings indicates the nature of the problem (Figure 4, left): while both (1) and (2) tend to
minimize the number of entries below the diagonal, the entries above the diagonal are not
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considered. Note the large Yij values in the upper right corner of the matrix plot; these
correspond to low ranked departments under the MVS1 criterion that hired repeatedly
from the very top departments in the ranking, yet they ended up with a very low MVS1
ranking. To correct this anomaly, we propose to also account for this type of secondary
violation, which we will call unexpected placements i.e., when a top department places too
many Ph.Ds in other lower ranked departments that should not be that attractive for their
graduating students. Penalizing this kind of violation (and its strength) will result in an
improved ranking for a department that “hires high”. A compound criteria, including the
strength of both unexpected hires and unexpected placements is:
(3) min
pi(Y)
SMVS2(pi(Y)) = min
pi(Y)
∑∑
i>j
(i− j)Yij + (i− j)Yji
where Yji in the second term considers abnormal entries above the diagonal (since i > j)
and (i−j) measures the strength of this type of violation, similarly to (2). It would be wrong
to use this compound criteria as it gives equal weight to the two types of violations, whereas
unexpected hires (or violations, i.e., entries below the diagonal) should be accounted more
severely than unexpected placements (above the diagonal). Assigning weights to each
objective is ad-hoc and therefore not a solution. Instead, to give primary importance to
violations (unexpected hires), the pairwise stochastic swapping algorithm that we utilize
(Appendix 3) in solving (2) was defined to accept a new ranking (i.e., exchanging the
rankings of two departments in question) if either:
(1) the number of violations is lower after the switch, or
(2) the number of violations is the same as before the switch, but the sum of the
strengths of the two types of violations, SMVS2(pi(Y)) is lower after the switch.
We refer to the resulting rankings as MVS2 rankings. They are reported in Appendix 1,
Table A1.
A concept related to the two types of violations, unexpected hires and unexpected place-
ments, found in the area of sport teams rankings, is that of an adjacent matrix in “hillside”
form (Pedings et al. (2012)). In sport team rankings, the adjacency matrix contains the
point or goal differential between all pairs of teams in a tournament. A sports tournament
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sociomatrix Y is in hillside form if it is ascending along all rows and descending along all
columns, i.e., if Yij ≤ Yik, ∀i,∀j ≤ k, and Yij ≥ Ykj , ∀j,∀i ≤ k (Pedings et al. , 2012).
Associated with this definition there are two types of violations: “upsets”, nonzero entries
below the diagonal matrix, and “weak wins”, entries above the diagonal matrix that do
not follow a hillside pattern, i.e., when team i did not score as many points as it would
have been expected when playing team j, with j > i.
While the concept of weak wins and upsets in a sports tournament is similar to that of
unexpected hires and placements, there are important differences. In a sports tournament,
the sociomatrix contains goal differentials, and therefore the hillside form as defined above
is the ideal form of a hierarchy. Contrary to a tournament, where every team plays against
all other teams and therefore a complete comparison network can be formed, we do not
have pairwise comparisons for all dyads in a faculty hiring network, i.e., not all edges are
observed as we have “observational zeros” as mentioned before, and this requires special
consideration. In addition, in a faculty hiring network the definition of a hillside form ad-
jacency matrix needs to be modified to account for both unexpected hiring and unexpected
placements since we wish to find a hierarchy such that we have both descending columns
and descending rows as well:
Yij ≥ Yik, ∀i,∀j ≤ k, and Yij ≥ Ykj , ∀j,∀i ≤ k.
That is, instead of winning by more goals against decreasingly ranked opponents, higher
ranked departments are expected to place fewer faculty at decreasingly lower ranked de-
partments. The MVS1-ranked matrix (see Figure 4, left) is not in what we define as hillside
form since there is a “peak” on the upper right cell of the matrix.
Figure 4 (right) shows the adjacency matrix for the ORIE departments sorted according
to the MVS2 indices. Note how the matrix is closer to hillside form, i.e., a matrix with both
rows and columns closer to being monotonically descending (Naval Postgraduate School
then deservedly ranks much higher, and the peak on the left plot is moved considerably
further to the left of the matrix).
Bootstrapping the observed network. Given the sparseness of the ORIE network due
to observational zeroes, we provide more robust MVS2 (and MVS1) indices by optimizing
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Figure 4. Left: matrix bar plot of the Y adjacency matrix under the MVS1 rankings,
which considers the strength of a type 1 violation (unexpected placement of a faculty
from a lower to a higher ranked department). Right: matrix bar plot of the Y adjacency
matrix under the MVS2 rankings, which considers the strength of a type 1 violation and
also of type 2 violations (unexpected number of hires from lower ranked departments).
The plot on the right is closer to “hillside” than the one on the left, a consequence of the
different objectives. Note the peak in the upper right corner in the plot on the left, these
are departments that hire an unexpected number of faculty from the top departments,
yet ended up, under the MVS1 rankings, in a very low position. The MVS2 rankings
ameliorate this situation to a certain degree.
1000 “bootstrapped”, or randomly sampled (with replacement) ORIE networks. The boot-
strapped networks are obtained by sampling edges, with replacement, from the observed
ORIE network, such that the probability of sampling an edge is proportional to the number
of faculty Yij in that edge. Each bootstrapped network Yb was then optimized according to
the SMVS1(pi(Yb)) or SMVS2(pi(Yb)) criteria using the stochastic search method of Appendix
3, and the resulting MVS values were recorded for each department. The results for MVS2
across the ensemble of bootstrapped replications are shown in Figure 5. Note how there is
less uncertainty in the MVS2 values in the extremes of the hierarchy, and more uncertainty
for those ranked in the middle, a phenomenon also reported for CS and Business networks
(Clauset et al. , 2015). The final indices MVS1 and MVS2 reported on Table A1 are the
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average ranks computed from the 1000 bootstrapped and optimized networks. A network
representation of the top 15 MVS2 departments is shown in Figure 6. This is the most
dense part of the ORIE network.
MVS2 rank ID of ORIE departments
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Figure 5. Boxplots of the boostrapped Minimum Violation and Strength (MVS2) ranks
for all 83 departments in the ORIE network, sorted by mean MVS2 value (1000 boot-
strapped networks). The reported MVS2 ranks correspond to the average values. Note
how the extreme ranks are less uncertain, a characteristic also reported for other disci-
plines (Clauset et al. , 2015).
Correlations between different ranks. Table 3 shows the Spearman correlation co-
efficients between various rankings computed for the ORIE departments, including two
published rankings (NRC and US News & World Report, see Appendix 1) and the MVR
and MVS2 rankings described earlier. All these rankings are shown in Table A1 in the Ap-
pendix 1. Not surprisingly, the MVR and MVS2 rankings are highly correlated, but a more
unexpected high correlation is between the MVS2 rankings and “Hub” importance ranks.
In a social network, Hubs and Authorities are types of vertices defined in an intertwined
manner: a Hub is a vertex that points to many other vertices with high authority, and an
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Figure 6. ORIE faculty hiring network for the top 15 departments sorted according
to MVS2 index. Edge width is proportional to number of hires. The edge density (or
connectance) of the ORIE network is high only for the departments at the top of the
hierarchy, but otherwise it is quite sparse, see Table 2.
authority is a vertex pointed to by many hubs (Newman, 2010). In a faculty hiring net-
work, vertices with high hub ranking are departments that “feed” faculty to departments
sought after by faculty candidates, thus Hub importance refers to placement capacity to
departments that in turn are important (similarly, the authority ranks refer to hiring ca-
pacity, the ability to attract and hire faculty from important departments). MVS2 is also
correlated with the out-degree rankings, but the correlation is not as high as with hub
importance: a department must not only generate many Ph.Ds but must place them in
the best possible departments. The PageRank, (left) Eigenvalue, and out degree rankings
are all highly correlated because the importance of “centrality” in a faculty hiring network
is bestowed by out degree.
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Table 3. Spearman correlation coefficients between the ranks of common measures of
vertex importance, including public rankings, in the observed ORIE network. Only pairs
of entries with no NA values were considered. (USN = US News 2016 ranks, NRC = 2011
NRC ranks).
MVS2 MVR USN NRC In-deg Out-deg Eigen PgRank Bet. Hub Auth.
MVS2 1.000
MVR 0.921 1.000
USN 0.857 0.776 1.000
NRC 0.849 0.819 0.876 1.000
In-deg 0.521 0.275 0.690 0.499 1.000
Out-deg 0.884 0.832 0.825 0.773 0.585 1.000
Eigen 0.873 0.840 0.757 0.789 0.438 0.863 1.000
PgRank 0.861 0.860 0.799 0.775 0.461 0.942 0.938 1.000
Bet. 0.490 0.418 0.479 0.518 0.539 0.754 0.659 0.709 1.000
Hub 0.923 0.855 0.857 0.845 0.569 0.933 0.917 0.906 0.637 1.000
Auth. 0.724 0.557 0.801 0.693 0.776 0.613 0.607 0.574 0.341 0.712 1.000
While there is significant correlation between published rankings and the MVS2 and
MVR indices, there are significant differences especially among the top 20 departments
(see Appendix 1 Table A1). For the top 20 MVS2 departments, the Spearman correlation
is 0.796 and 0.711 between the MVS2 and US News and NRC rankings, respectively, with
two departments in the top 20 MVS2 indices not in the US News list.
5. Latent location variables and clustering of ORIE departments: a
latent exponential random graph model
Descriptive statistics as those in section 2 can only provide partial information about
the structure of a complex network. Single indices such as the MVR and MVS indices (or
such as published rankings) that try to capture the “prestige” of an academic department
are inherently incomplete. One feature that was evident from the descriptive analysis of
the ORIE network (Sections 2 and 4) was that there is a core of departments at the top
of the hierarchy that form denser connections, while the periphery is much more sparsely
connected. Also, there is evidence the steepness of the hierarchy varies within the hierarchy
(Appendix 2 and Table 2). This indicates that in order to better understand the structure
of the network, rather than finding a linear hierarchy based on single indices, it is worth
finding groups of similar departments.
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In this section, rather then simply applying clustering algorithms directly to the ORIE
network data, we first consider the observed ORIE network as a noisy realization, or sample,
from a stochastic network model. We study a particular type of exponential random graph
model (ERGM) in which the conditional probability of a tie between two actors, given
covariates (if any), depends on the distance between actors in an unobserved or latent
“social space” (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2008).
In a latent ERGM model, the sociomatrix (or adjacency matrix) Y is viewed as a random
variable that depends on parameters β, covariates x and positions Z = {Zi}ni=1 in a ‘social
space”. The latent ERGM model we used is:
P (Y = y|β,x,Z) =
∏
i,j
P (Yi,j = yij |β,x,Z)
P (Yij = yij |β,x,Z) = f(yij |µij) =
exp(−µij)µyijij
yij !
log(µij) = E[Yij |β,x,Z] = ηij(β,x,Z)
ηij(β,x,Z) =
p∑
k=1
xk,i,jβk − |Zi − Zj |
We thus adopted a Poisson density for the number of hires between two departments Yij
and a link function η = g(µ) = log(µij) which is log-linear in the covariates and in the
distances in an Euclidean latent space (defined by the Zi’s). The latent positions are
assumed to follow a mixture of spherical multivariate normals in the social space, which
could have in principle any dimension d:
(4) Zi
i.i.d.∼
G∑
g=1
λgNd(µg, σ
2
gId), i = 1, ..., n
where 0 ≤ λg ≤ 1 is the probability an individual belongs to group g (
∑G
g λg = 1)
Fitting the model implies finding estimates for the parameters β, (λg,µg, σ
2
g) for g =
1, ...G. A Bayesian formulation has been proposed by Krivitsky et al. (Krivitsky et al. ,
2009) who proposed a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation approach based on
Gibbs sampling updates for β,µg, σg, λg and a Metropolis-Hastings update for the latent
positions Zi. This method has been implemented in the latentnet (Krivitsky & Handcock,
2008) R package. The MCMC fitting routine is in function ergmm. This function allows
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one to use certain model terms that do consider self-loops, an important characteristic of
the ORIE network as discussed in section 1. We use the method described in Krivitsky &
Handcock (2008) to setup the priors for all hyperparameters.
For the MCMC estimation, for each alternative model we used a warm-up period of
50,000 iterations, then ran the MCMC routine for 5,000,000 more iterations, and finally
collected statistics only every 100 iterations over 50,000 more iterations.
There are not many techniques available for ERGM model selection. We selected a
final model comparing the alternative models’ Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), con-
sidering whether the MCMC estimation procedure converged satisfactorily or not for a
given model, and looking at model diagnostics involving the prediction performance of
each model considered. Models with 2-dimensional (d = 2) location vectors Zi had diffi-
culty converging; the chains did not show adequate mixing. For d = 3, G = 2 (2 groups or
clusters in 3 dimensions), BIC=5171 but the βj coefficients failed to converge; for d = 3
and G = 3, BIC=5221 (somewhat worse) but it had satisfactory MCMC convergence for
all its parameters (see Figures 7 and 8).
The fitted final model, obtained from the posterior means of all parameters, is:
log(µij) = log(E[Yij |β,x,Z]) = β0 + β1xij + β2xi + β3xj − |Zi − Zj |, i, j = 1, ..., n
= 2.8363︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2.52,3.10)
+ 0.1722︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.09,0.24)
xii −1.1190︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−1.21,−1.02)
xi + 0.2828︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.19,0.37)
xj − |Zi − Zj |(5)
where xij = log(MVS2(i)) if i = j and xii = 0 for i 6= j is a self “loop” covariate,
modeling self-hires, xi = log(MVS2(i)) is a “sender” covariate and xj = log(MVS2(j)) is a
“receiver” covariate (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2008). Numbers in the under braces are the
95% credible posterior intervals for each coefficient, they all exclude zero. The sender and
receiver covariates model the propensity of a department to either provide or receive faculty.
The motivation for this model was that the MVS2 indices can provide an indication of the
number of faculty flowing between departments. Taking the log(MVS2) implies we assume
effects are linear, given this is a log-linear model. For instance, suppose MVS2(1) = 1 and
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Figure 7. MCMC diagnostics for model (5): log-likelihood and values of β0, β1, and β2.
All convergence diagnostics are adequate, i.e., trace plots are stable and therefore param-
eter values converge in distribution. Traces shown for last 5M iterations, distributions
shown for last 50K iterations.
MVS2(2) = 2. Then the fitted model predicts µ11 = 16.94 self hires on average for the top
ORIE department.
5.1. Model prediction performance. The fitted latent location ERGM model (5) ade-
quately predicts the expected value of the number of hires within and between departments.
Using i = j in (5), the predicted mean self-hire values µii are obtained, and these are con-
trasted with the observed self-hired values in the ORIE network in the top plot of Figure
1 (red line), showing excellent agreement. Figure 9 diagrammatically shows the fitted ex-
pected number of hires between all 83 ORIE departments, which can be compared to the
plot on the right of Figure 4, again demonstrating very close behavior to the observations.
More specific model diagnostics for ERGM models are based on Monte Carlo simulations
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Figure 8. MCMC diagnostics for model (5), (cont.): values of β4, Z1, Z2, and Z3. All
convergence diagnostics are adequate, i.e., trace plots are stable and therefore parameter
values converge in distribution. Traces shown for last 5M iterations, distributions shown
for last 50K iterations.
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Figure 9. Predicted mean number of faculty hires in the ORIE network (µˆij) given by
the fitted latent location ERGM model (5). Height equals expected number of faculty,
axes are the 83 departments sorted according to MVS2. Compare with the observed
number of hires, the plot on the right of Figure 4.
of the fitted network and comparison of the observed statistics to those in the ensemble of
simulations.
We performed posterior checks based on one thousand simulated networks from the
posterior of the fitted model using the latentnet R package. We compared posterior
properties of the simulated networks against the corresponding statistics of the observed
ORIE faculty network. Figure 10 contrasts the actual observed values for the in and out
degree distribution (bold red) with the interquartile range of the simulated values from the
posteriors (blue boxplots). Both distributions can approximately generate the observations,
including the very skewed out-degree distribution. There is some over-generation of nodes
with in-degrees equal to 6 and 7, and over-generation of nodes with out-degrees equal
to one edge. Figure 11 (left) contrasts posterior simulations of the minimum geodesic
distances between the vertices and the actual values, which are reproduced well by the
model. The plot on the right contrasts the posterior simulations vs. actual values for the
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edge-wise shared partners, defined as the number of edges eij such that both i and j have
k common neighbors. The peculiar shape of this distribution is very well reproduced by
the latent ERGM model. Finally, in Figure 12 (left) we first computed the posterior edge
density distribution of the simulated networks and contrasted it with the actual value (red
dotted line), which falls among the simulated values, indicating the model can reproduce
networks with the correct density of edges. The number of departments that self-hire ranges
from around 49 to 78 in the posterior simulated networks, and this includes the observed
value (61) in the real ORIE network (red dotted line in Figure 12, center). Finally, the
proportion of Ph.Ds self hired by their original department ranges from about 12% to 20%,
again including the observed 14% (red dotted line, Figure 12, right).
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Figure 10. Diagnostic plots for the ERGM model (5) based on 1000 simulations. Left:
in-degree distribution. Right: out degree distribution. Boxplots give the interquartile
ranges and the whiskers the extreme values simulated from the posterior of the fitted
model (5), red continuous lines are the observed values. With exception of a slight over-
generation of vertices with in-degree 6 an 7 and out-degree equal to one, the fitted model
reproduces the observed degree distributions.
We conclude from these “goodness of fit” posterior simulations that the general structure
of the ORIE faculty hired network is captured by the fitted latent ERGM (5).
5.2. Determination of groups of departments. The latent ERGM model permits us
to determine G groups in which the nodes are clustered in the location space Z. We
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Figure 11. Diagnostic plots for the latent ERGM model (5) based on 1000 simulations.
Left: geodesic distance distribution. Right: edge-wise shared partner distribution. The
number of edge-wise shared partners is defined as the number of edges eij such that both
i and j have k common neighbors (”shared partners”). Boxplots give the interquartile
range and the whiskers the extreme values simulated from the posterior of the fitted model
(5), red continuous lines are the observed values. The fitted model is able to reproduce
the observed statistics. Note how almost 40% of the edges in the ORIE network have no
common neighbors.
found the clustering provided by the ERGM model unreliable, the clusters did not seem
to form in any particular meaningful way. Instead, to select groups of departments, we
took the mean of the posterior of the latent locations Zi, i = 1, ..., 83 and ran the PAM
(Partitioned around medoids) algorithm (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2008) to find 3 groups
(clusters) of departments. This provided a much better group separation than using the λg
proportions in (4) as the basis of clustering. The number of clusters was found using PAM
and the “Gap” statistics (Tibshirani et al. , 2001) that determines a goodness of clustering
measure. The best number of clusters is either 1 (no clustering) or 3 from the gap statistics
(see Figure 13). We therefore form 3 groups or clusters of departments, and the groups are
displayed in different color in Figure 14 and listed in Appendix 1(Table A1).
It is notable how well the first latent group includes only departments who more consis-
tently hire from top departments in the hierarchical MVS2 order. Using the three groups
of departments, we can reduce the ORIE network to a simple aggregated network where
faculty flow within and between the three groups (Figure 15). Most of the hires (62 %) take
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Figure 12. Diagnostic plots for the latent location ERGM model (5) based on 1000
simulations. Left: edge density distribution. center: number of departments that self-
hire. Right: proportion of self-hired faculty. Observed values in ORIE network are given
by red vertical lines. In all cases, the fitted model reproduces the observed values in the
actual network.
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Figure 13. Simulated “gap” statistics (Tibshirani et al. , 2001) to determine the number
of clusters in the latent variables Zi identified in the exponential random graph model
(5). Either 1 or 3 clusters are identified, we chose 3 clusters due to better interpretability.
place within groups, only 38% is between groups. Note how groups 3 and 1 are very thinly
connected: only 3 faculty receiving their Ph.D. in the 34 departments in group 3 have been
hired by the 14 departments in group 1. Inversely, only 14 Ph.D.’s from group 1 have been
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Figure 14. Latent Positions Z1, Z2, Z3 after fitting (5). Vertices are colored according
to the three identified groups (black=group 1, red=group 2, and green = group 3). Left:
plot over first two latent variables, Right: plot over the 3-dimensional latent space (edges
not shown). Numbers correspond to MVS2 indices, see Table A1. Evident features are
the few connections between groups 1 and 3, and how group 2 contains departments with
a high degree of “betweenness” (Newman, 2010).
hired in departments from group 3. Group 3 has also provided few (26) faculty to group 2.
This indicates that the ORIE network is strongly separated in clusters, with departments
in the bottom of the hierarchy (group 3) producing almost no faculty for those on the
top. Interestingly, the “intermediate” departments in group 2 (35 departments) include
the top 7 departments as ranked by “betweenness” and overall have the lowest (i.e. most
important) betweenness average ranks (38.3 for group 2, 42.2 for group 1, 44.7 for group
3). It could be argued that the intermediate departments in group 2 keep the ORIE as
a single, connected discipline. An interesting question for further work is to determine if
the degree of interaction between groups 1 and 3 is higher or lower than the interaction
threshold between different (but close) disciplines, such as OR and Computer Science, for
instance.
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Figure 15. Simplified ORIE network, showing the faculty hires between the three iden-
tified groups of departments. Edge width is proportional to the number of faculty hires,
which are the numbers shown on each edge. The bulk of the hire-placements occurs
within group. Note also how there are very few connections between groups 1 and 3, with
departments in group 3 contributing only to three hires in departments in group 1.
6. Discussion and Conclusions.
We have demonstrated the existence of a near linear hierarchy in the ORIE faculty
hiring network through the application of modern techniques in statistical analysis of so-
cial networks that exclude subjective assessments. We provided an approximate linear
hierarchy index (Minimum Violation and Strength, MVS2) obtained through optimizing
bootstrapped networks sampled from the original ORIE network and therefore not sensi-
tive to the unequal density of edges (and that stand in contrast to published rankings).
Single indices of hierarchy, however, do not capture all important features in a complex
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network, for instance, the highly connected core of the departments in the top of the hi-
erarchy, the high incidence of self-hires, or the skewed out degree distribution. This is the
reason we propose and fit the latent location Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM)
of section 5 and the associated cluster analysis as a better approach for understanding the
hiring patterns in the ORIE faculty network (and of any such hiring network), resulting in
groups that do not necessarily follow the MVS2 ranks. The model successfully captures the
main characteristics of the ORIE faculty network, including its node degree distributions,
its incidence of self-hiring, and its edge density distribution among others. This model
allowed us to simplify the ORIE network to one with only three groups of departments,
with most hiring taking place within groups, also showing the little interaction between
groups at the extremes of the hierarchy. To be in the first group, a department needs to
consistently hire from top departments, even if it does not place that many Ph.D.’s in other
top departments, a non-existent notion in competitive sports and ecology. Furthermore,
departments in the intermediate group act as a “link” between the other two groups, keep-
ing the network connected as a single discipline, with departments in this group having
among the highest “betweenness” importance (Newman, 2010).
ORIE is a field with a high self-hiring rate across the whole network compared to Com-
puter Science and Business Schools (close to two and three times, respectively). A high
self-hiring rate may reduce the transfer of information and discipline-specific knowledge
(including curriculum innovations) between departments.
We are aware hiring decisions are not only made based on the “prestige” of the potential
“sender” and “receiver” departments. Besides the obvious impact of each candidate’s Ph.D.
research credentials, they are also a consequence of complex politics, personalities and styles
of the faculty in the “receiver” department and its college administration. Sometimes the
reputation of the Ph.D. adviser, and not only that of the sending department, matters in a
hiring decision. Sometimes department chairs overwrite the majority opinion of their own
faculty in hiring decisions, thus some actual hires may not represent the normal behavior
of a department. These aspects of the hiring-placement process can be thought to add
“noise” to the collected data, which is already sparse at lower levels of the hierarchy. In
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our analysis we handled this noise via permutation tests or bootstrapping when finding
evidence of a hierarchy or trying to determine an index, or through a statistical model for
the network. But as discussed in section 3.1, zero valued edges do not necessarily indicate
the absence of a dominance relation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from
the available data whether an “observational zero” in a social network implies the lack
of a dominance relation or rather its presence, with the dominated party trying to avoid
interactions with the dominant one (i.e., departments avoiding hiring from higher ranked
departments).
The analysis presented in this paper refers to data collected at a single point in time
(summer 2016). This neglects the dynamic effect of hires over the years which could be
modeled if more complete data about the years of subsequent employments of each single
professor in the network were available (our datasets contain partial data, too incomplete
to attempt such analysis and this is left for future work). Dynamic exponential random
graph models seem a good way to study such dynamic networks.
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Appendix 1: Institution data
The list of ORIE departments was formed by merging those Ph.D. granting departments
in the 2016 US News & World report ”Industrial/Manufacturing/Systems Engineering”
graduate rankings (accessed 5/12/2016) with those in the 2011 National Research Council
(NRC, 2011) rankings for ”Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial En-
gineering”. The NRC lists both departments and programs, so an institution may appear
more than once; we included each institution only once in the network (their NRC ranking
shown below corresponds to the highest ranking of either program or department) and
collected the faculty information as if it were a single department. Only departments with
existing web pages as of May 2016 and that have a Ph.D. program were included (this
excluded U. of Nebraska-Lincoln). The NRC rankings listed in Table A1 below are those
given by the average of the 5% and 95% “R” rankings, listed in standard competition order.
There are Industrial Engineering departments which are merged with other disciplines in
a single department (e.g., Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, or Computer Systems
and Industrial Engineering); an effort was made to include only those faculty in the ORIE
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field. It was assumed, in the absence of information, that a faculty working in an ORIE
department obtained his/her Ph.D. in the ORIE department of the listed institution (a
number of faculty only lists their alma mater institution but not their alma mater’s de-
partment). Also, faculty that received their Ph.D. outside of the USA (or outside of our
list of departments) were not considered. Only faculty in tenured or tenure-track positions
were included, although it was not always clear if some faculty positions were tenured or
not.
It is important to point out that the edges (vi, vj) of the ORIE network are formed
by faculty currently (as of summer 2016) in department j who received their Ph.D. in
department i. This evidently neglects the movement of faculty through some of other
intermediate departments between i and j and is a potential source of error. Our dataset
contains partial information with respect to these intermediate departments where each
faculty worked before their current job, information too incomplete to attempt an analysis.
The final ORIE dataset is contained in 2 files, one for the 83 institutions (vertices) and
its attributes, and one for the 1179 faculty (edges) and its attributes. The data collection
effort was undertaken in summer 2016 over a 4 week span. After data gathering, all faculty
data was checked manually for errors by 3 persons. Table A1 contains the attributes in
the institutions file, which includes ranks of various measures of vertex importance and the
latent groups found in section 5.
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Table A1. Latent group membership and importance measure ranks, ORIE depart-
ments, sorted by group and then by MVS2 index.
Ranks
Institution Group MVS2 MVS1 MVR USNews NRC In-deg Out-deg Eigen. PageR. Bet Hub Auth.
Stanford 1 1 2 2 4 1 5 2 2 2 17 2 2
UC Berkeley 1 2 1 1 2 4 36 6 3 3 26 3 18
MIT 1 3 3 3 6 3 3 1 1 1 18 1 1
Carnegie M. 1 4 4 4 NA 7 79 12 6 8 14 8 59
Princeton 1 5 5 5 NA 18 66 33 8 16 68 15 16
Cornell 1 7 7 7 7 8 16 10 4 6 25 7 12
Columbia 1 8 8 8 11 20 22 17 16 12 58 17 6
Northwest. 1 11 11 11 4 6 20 15 10 9 39 10 28
U. Penn 1 14 15 18 28 14 14 24 7 17 43 20 7
USC 1 17 19 19 12 29 12 28 22 22 35 25 10
UT (Aus) 1 19 18 16 19 23 46 29 12 15 33 22 21
UNC (Ch-H) 1 31 35 42 NA 34 32 58 23 45 48 38 36
Naval Post. 1 50 83 75 23 NA 23 69 69 78 70 60 14
Wash. U. 1 67 66 43 39 NA 69 71 71 68 67 71 34
U. Michigan 2 6 6 6 2 5 11 3 9 5 5 4 8
Purdue 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 13 7 6 6 13
GA Tech 2 10 10 4 1 2 5 4 1 5 1 5 3
U. Illi. (UC) 2 12 14 14 15 33 13 13 17 14 28 14 5
U. Wis (Ma) 2 13 12 12 7 9 21 14 15 11 10 9 22
U. Florida 2 15 13 13 19 23 56 9 19 13 36 16 38
Penn St. 2 16 16 15 12 12 7 8 18 10 4 13 15
Ohio St. 2 18 21 21 17 9 19 11 25 19 12 19 19
U. Minn. 2 20 20 20 32 46 61 39 37 38 61 29 31
U. Maryland 2 21 17 17 NA 16 60 22 11 21 37 11 32
U. Pitt 2 23 24 24 23 39 25 16 32 24 19 24 20
VPI 2 24 25 25 9 15 10 7 26 18 7 12 25
U. Arizona 2 25 27 27 28 35 53 26 41 37 55 27 51
NC State 2 26 33 32 12 12 6 19 40 30 15 30 29
Lehigh 2 27 23 26 18 28 39 34 30 29 47 43 40
SUNY Buf 2 28 29 31 28 37 28 21 27 25 20 26 33
U. Miss (Co) 2 29 26 23 58 31 78 54 34 51 69 45 63
Rutgers 2 30 28 30 21 38 47 35 21 23 34 44 49
Texas A& M 2 32 31 34 15 24 15 20 20 20 2 23 30
U. Virginia 2 33 37 35 28 23 27 37 48 42 38 34 23
U. Mass. 2 34 39 46 36 50 8 25 29 31 23 18 9
Boston U. 2 35 30 28 39 30 62 60 47 57 66 53 24
U. Arkansas 2 36 40 41 39 57 31 44 39 48 40 49 43
RPI 2 39 41 37 21 19 37 36 55 41 46 39 45
U. Wash. 2 40 42 40 26 35 57 48 49 52 59 42 35
Iowa St. 2 43 45 47 26 32 26 40 35 39 21 41 37
U. Conn. 2 44 59 54 NA 54 35 57 58 67 63 31 39
G. Wash. U. 2 45 44 51 53 53 43 42 33 40 50 37 27
Arizona St. 2 47 48 49 23 21 1 18 28 27 3 21 11
Northeastern 2 53 81 82 36 27 4 70 70 79 71 51 4
Stevens 2 55 61 74 39 NA 17 49 50 55 53 40 17
G. Mason 2 56 51 60 32 NA 30 38 36 43 22 35 42
NJIT 2 62 79 80 NA 57 34 83 82 83 82 80 26
Case West. 2 64 32 53 38 43 77 59 14 26 41 36 55
Worcester P 2 73 74 64 53 NA 73 80 75 80 74 82 46
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Table A1. Latent group membership and importance measure ranks, ORIE depart-
ments, sorted by group and then by MVS2 index (cont.).
Ranks
Institution Group MVS2 MVS1 MVR USNews NRC In-deg Out-deg Eigen. PageR. Bet Hub Auth.
U. Iowa 3 22 22 22 39 22 80 31 24 35 54 28 71
U. S. Florida 3 37 38 36 46 54 54 27 42 34 11 33 67
Oklahoma St 3 38 34 38 39 41 40 30 38 36 45 32 44
Kansas St. 3 41 50 39 46 47 49 46 62 49 65 57 48
U. Illi. (Chi) 3 42 36 33 46 45 71 52 45 53 62 48 61
Texas Tech 3 46 47 48 53 40 55 23 51 33 9 47 68
U. Oklahoma 3 48 53 56 46 50 42 53 57 61 49 58 50
Clemson 3 49 58 58 32 47 29 51 63 58 44 61 52
Miss. U. 3 51 43 44 58 62 50 32 44 32 31 50 78
Auburn 3 52 49 52 32 42 48 41 54 47 29 52 66
Wayne St. 3 54 54 61 53 44 44 64 52 60 42 62 41
U. Louisville 3 57 57 50 66 62 51 55 65 54 56 65 58
U. Alabama 3 58 52 45 NA 61 67 47 64 44 57 63 57
UC Florida 3 59 55 57 39 54 38 45 56 50 24 59 62
UT (Dal) 3 60 46 29 58 NA 83 74 53 77 76 55 82
U. Houston 3 61 62 55 53 65 72 50 60 56 52 56 77
Air Force IT 3 63 71 77 46 NA 18 62 72 76 51 54 47
SUNY (Bin) 3 65 80 81 58 57 24 65 76 75 75 67 53
Oregon St. 3 66 77 72 46 49 41 63 73 69 72 69 69
Wichita St. 3 68 69 78 66 NA 33 76 67 73 60 78 56
W. Virginia 3 69 63 70 66 NA 52 56 59 59 13 66 64
UT (Arling) 3 70 60 66 58 NA 45 43 43 46 8 46 70
U. Tenn. 3 71 56 69 58 62 58 61 31 28 27 68 72
NCA&T St 3 72 78 71 66 NA 64 82 78 82 78 81 81
Florida St. 3 74 64 79 66 NA 59 66 46 62 16 64 65
U. NC (Ch.) 3 75 65 73 58 NA 63 73 66 74 32 73 76
U. Wis (Mil) 3 76 76 65 58 NA 74 81 77 81 77 83 60
Old Dom U 3 77 67 76 NA 66 65 68 68 66 64 74 83
Ohio U. 3 78 68 83 66 NA 68 67 61 63 30 72 80
New Mex St 3 79 73 63 NA 60 76 79 83 72 83 75 73
U. Miami 3 80 75 68 66 52 75 75 79 71 79 77 79
U. Ark. LR 3 81 82 67 46 NA 70 72 74 70 73 70 54
Montana St. 3 82 72 59 NA NA 82 78 81 65 81 76 74
Florida IT 3 83 70 62 NA NA 81 77 80 64 80 79 81
Appendix 2: Statistical tests on the steepness of a linear hierarchy in a
network
De Vries et al. (2006) introduces the concept of the steepness of a linear hierarchy,
namely, the size of absolute differences between adjacently ranked individuals in their
overall success in winning dominance encounters. When these differences are large, the
hierarchy is said to be steep and is called shallow otherwise. DeVries’ steepness measure is
based on the Di score by David (1987), a measure of the dominance success of an individual
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i given by the unweighted and weighted sum of the individual’s dyadic proportions of
“wins” (in our case, Ph.D. placed in other departments) combined with an unweighted and
weighted sum of its dyadic proportion of “losses” (Ph.D’s hired from other departments).
The proportions of “wins” Pij are defined as Pij = yij/nij where yij is the (i, j) entry in the
sociomatrix Y and nij is the total number of interactions between i and j (i.e., nij = yij +
yji). David’s (normalized) scores are defined as Di = (wi + w2i − li − l2i + n(n− 1)/) /n
where wi =
∑
j 6=i Pij , w2i =
∑
j 6=iwjPij , li =
∑
j 6=i Pji and l2i =
∑
j 6=i ljPji. The factors
containing the total number of individuals scale this term to make it vary between 0 and
n− 1. To measure the steepness of a hierarchy, order the individuals according to Di. Call
R the rank of the individuals. Then a simple linear regression model D = β1R + β0 is fit
to the data. The estimated coefficient βˆ1 is an estimate of the steepness of the hierarchy.
To test for the significance of the steepness of a hierarchy using a permutation test,
assume as null hypothesis that the steepness is that given by a randomly formed network.
Fitting linear regression models D = β1R+β0 from the randomly generated networks each
with ranks R will result in an empirical distribution of the βˆ1 coefficient, which can then
be compared to the βˆ1 estimate from the actual network. Small empirical p-values imply
the hierarchy is significantly steeper than that given by a simple random graph.
Figure 16 shows the regression models fitted to the David statistics for the ORIE, CS and
Business networks. The ORIE and CS networks appear to have a steep hierarchy only for
approximately the first 10 departments. This is in contrast to Business schools which have
a steeper slope for about a third of the departments. Figure 17 indicates, however, that
the slope is significantly different to that of a random graph in all 3 cases. The steepness
results shown are related to the connectedness (density) of the 3 networks, since the CS
network is the most sparse, followed by ORIE and then Business.
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Figure 16. Fitted line and observed David’s statistics for a linear hierarchy. Left: ORIE
network (n = 83, slope = -0.02782). Middle: Computer Science (n = 205, slope =
-0.01281). Right: Business (n = 112, slope=-0.1358). Note how for ORIE and CS
the observed absolute slope increases for the first 10 departments, indicating a steeper
dominance at the top of the hierarchy relative to other departments, but otherwise the
hierarchy is quite flat.
Observed Normalized DS vs. Randomized Distribution
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Figure 17. Randomized distribution (10K simulations) of the De Vries’ test statistic for
the significance of the steepness in the dominance hierarchy of (Left) the complete ORIE
network, (Middle) the Computer Science network, and (Right) the Business network. Red
vertical lines are the observed David’s Di statistics. In all cases, the empirical p-values
are 0.0, indicating significance steepness in the hierarchy of each faculty network.
Appendix 3: Stochastic search algorithm for finding MVS rankings
Algorithm 1 Minimum Violation and Strength (MVS) ranking of boostrapped networks
1: procedure optimize(Y, B, burnin, iterations, interval)
2: for b = 1 to B do
3: Yb ← bootstrap(Y)
4: pi0(Yb)← out degree rankings
5: for k = 1 to burnin do
6: pi(Yb)← SWAP(Yb, pi0(Yb))
7: for k = 1 to iterations do
8: pib(Yb)← SWAP(Yb, pi0(Yb))
9: if int(k/interval)− k/interval == 0 then Save pib(Yb)
10: MVS2(Yb)← average(saved pib(Yb)’s)
return MVS2 ← average(MVS2(Y1), ....,MVS2(YB))
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Algorithm 2 Stochastic swapping to improve a given ranking
1: procedure swap(Y, pi(Y))
2: Randomly select vertices i and j and swap them to form pinew(Y).
3: if S(pinew(Y)) > S(pi(Y)) or (S(pinew(Y)) = S(pi(Y)) and S(pinew(Y)) < S(pi(Y)))
4: then
5: Accept the swap and return pinew(Y).
6: else return pi(Y))
Algorithm 1 is a modification of the optimization approach in Clauset et al. (2015),
who found minimum violation rankings, adapted for finding MVS rankings. They reported
exchanges of more than 2 vertices did not improve the solutions found with swapping pairs
of vertices. The algorithm takes as initial ranking that of the out-degrees of each node
gives preference to departments that place faculty in other departments. In analogy with
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, the algorithm was run for a burn-in period of 105
iterations (that are discarded), after which 1000 ranks pib(Y) were saved every 100 iterations
(i.e., iterations=105 and interval=100 in Algorithm 1). The averages of these 1000 ranks
gives the MVS1 or MVS2 ranks. In addition, to incorporate the uncertainties related to
the low density areas of the ORIE network, which could be considered as “noise”, the
optimization was repeated for B = 1000 different bootstrapped networks, where the edges
in each network were randomly sampled with replacement from the edges of the real ORIE
network, with sampling probabilities proportional to the edge attributes Yij . The reported
MVS1 and MVS2 ranks in Table A1 correspond to the ensemble mean of the optimal
ranks obtained from each of these bootstrapped replications, using either SMVS1(pi(Y)) or
SMVS2(pi(Y)) in the SWAP procedure (Algorithm 2).
